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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine two people, each injured by different medical devices,
individually sue the medical-device manufacturers under various negli-
t Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2010, University of
Miami School of Law; B.S.E. 2002, University of Pennsylvania. I thank my family, particularly
my mother and my husband, for always supporting me in everything that I do. I also thank
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gence theories.' The first litigant was injured by a Class III2 pacemaker
device, which had been approved under the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's (FDA) substantial equivalence 3 process (also known as 510(k)
review). The second litigant was injured when a recently implanted
Class III medical device, a balloon catheter, ruptured and caused a heart
blockage. But this device was approved under the FDA's premarket
approval (PMA)4 process. Both litigants suffered severe injuries. Both
devices were allegedly defective. Both devices went through the proper
FDA channels before entering the market. However, the first litigant is
able to sue the manufacturer, 5 while the second litigant's claims are pre-
empted by federal law. This inconsistency is exactly the result reached
by the Supreme Court in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.6
In Riegel, the Supreme Court held that the Medical Device Amend-
ments (MDA) of 19767 preempted certain tort-law claims against manu-
facturers of medical devices that received premarket approval from the
FDA.8 As a result, consumers no longer have a legal remedy if they are
injured by certain medical devices. This result stands in stark contrast to
the outcome in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,9 where the court determined that
tort-law claims against manufacturers of substantially equivalent devices
were not preempted.10 The Supreme Court rarely overrules its previous
decisions, and Riegel's treatment of Lohr is no exception. Rather than
revisit the merits of its holding in Lohr, the Court distinguished the case
1. The facts in this hypothetical have been adapted from Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
999 (2008), and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
2. The FDA classifies medical devices into three categories-Class I, Class II, or Class III.
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2006). Class III is "the most stringent regulatory category" because these
devices are typically used "to support or sustain human life." FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/
PremarketApprovalPMA/default.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
3. The FDA approves some Class III medical devices upon a showing by the manufacturer
that the device is "at least as safe and effective ... [as] a legally marketed device." FDA, http://
www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Premar
ketSubmissions/PremarketNotification5 I Ok/default.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). This process is
known as the "substantial equivalence" process or § 510(k) review. Id.
4. Premarket approval is the FDA's rigorous regulatory process for reviewing Class III
medical devices that have not been deemed substantially equivalent to currently available devices.
See FDA, supra note 2. The process requires the manufacturer to show "sufficient valid scientific
evidence to assure that the device is safe and effective for its intended uses(s)." Id.
5. In Lohr, the Supreme Court held that patients injured by substantially equivalent medical
devices may sue the manufacturer. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494. The Court reasoned that these
claims were not preempted because the FDA's substantial equivalence determination did not
constitute federal requirements that would displace state requirements. Id. at 493.
6. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360m (2006).
8. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
9. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
10. Id. at 494.
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and muddied the waters in MDA preemption jurisprudence by hinging
its analysis on the distinction between premarket approval (reviewed in
Riegel) and substantial equivalence (reviewed in Lohr).
MDA preemption jurisprudence has been cyclical, with eras of
intense confusion and attempted clarification."' Lohr was the Court's
attempt to clarify the law on MDA preemption after conflicting lower-
court interpretations of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.12 led to widely
disparate rulings on preemption under the MDA."3 This article argues
that after Riegel, MDA preemption jurisprudence will return to an era of
confusion because of the inconsistencies between Riegel and the Court's
prior preemption rulings. The legal underpinnings of Riegel and Lohr
are at odds; thus, the Court's effort to harmonize the two decisions cre-
ates uncertainty in MDA preemption jurisprudence.
This article analyzes the legal, historical, and policy reasons why
preemption based on such a narrow distinction is both unwise and
unsupported by the text of the MDA. These reasons include the text of
the regulations at issue in this preemption debate, the nature of the FDA
approval process, and fundamental fairness as evidenced by the hypo-
thetical at the beginning of this article. Although the Riegel ruling is
directly applicable to only a limited number of devices,' 4 its reach is
widespread because of the larger implications for preemption jurispru-
dence. In particular, the decision will shape how future courts view the
agency's role in the preemption debate, what courts will consider when
interpreting express preemption 15 clauses, and whether the Supreme
Court's long-articulated presumption against preemption is dead in the
MDA context.
Part II focuses on the legal and regulatory climate leading up to
Riegel. Part III reviews and critiques the rationale behind the preemption
distinction set forth in Riegel. This section also discusses the dissimilar
legal underpinnings that make Lohr and Riegel irreconcilable, including
the scope of express preemption analysis and courts' deference to fed-
eral agencies. Part IV examines Riegel's implications for industry stake-
holders including patients, physicians, and device manufacturers. Part V
offers a brief conclusion.
11. See Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of
Products Liability Claims after Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 696-99 (1997).
12. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
13. Leflar & Adler, supra note I1, at 692-93; see discussion infra Part IID.
14. Approximately 10% of medical devices reach the market through the PMA process.
Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products Liability
Claims, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 415, 428 (2008).
15. "[E]xpress preemption occurs where Congress ... speak[s] directly to the preemptive
effect of a particular statute." KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPnON 15 (Paul J.
Mishkin et al. eds., 1991).
2009]
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II. TiH REGULATORY AND LEGAL CONTEXT SURROUNDING
MDA PREEMPTION
A. History of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976
The federal government initially acquired oversight of medical
devices through the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938.16
However, the FDA lacked the authority to screen medical devices before
they entered the market 7 until Congress passed the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA).' 8 As a result, new medical devices were
largely unregulated by the federal government, and that role was princi-
pally held by the states until 1976.19
The "Dalkon Shield controversy" changed Congress's passive,
hands-off approach. As technology rapidly changed, Congress recog-
nized the need to ensure that medical devices functioned as the manufac-
turers claimed." This realization was undoubtedly influenced by the
circumstances surrounding the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, a
defectively designed contraceptive that injured thousands of women.21
The Senate acknowledged this controversy as an impetus for passing the
MDA, noting that "many of the deaths and much of the illness attributed
to this device could have been prevented if medical device legislation
* . . had been in effect when the Dalkon shield was developed. 22
B. The FDA's Implementation of the MDA
With its new-found power, the FDA began to implement "a regime
of detailed federal oversight. '23 As directed by the statute, the FDA clas-
sified potential new devices into three categories based on the level of
risk associated with the device.24 Class III was reserved for the most
dangerous devices. 5 New Class III devices can only be marketed to the
general public if they pass one of two FDA-mandated review processes:
16. S. REP. No. 94-33, at 2 (1975).
17. David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 95, 102 (2005)
(noting that pre-MDA, the FDA did not have screening authority for devices, even though it had
possessed that authority over drugs for decades).
18. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360m (2006).
19. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1002 (2008); see also Leflar & Adler, supra
note 11, at 703 n.66 (noting at least thirteen state statutes regulating medical devices before
Congress passed the MDA).
20. S. REP. No. 94-33, at 5.
21. See Vladeck, supra note 17, at 103 ("[T]he MDA was enacted to strengthen consumer
protection in light of public health tragedies like that triggered by the Dalkon Shield.").
22, S. REP. No. 94-33, at 2.
23. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1003.
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2006).
25. See id. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (noting that Class Im7 includes devices with the "potential [for]
unreasonable risk of illness or injury").
[Vol. 64:305
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substantial equivalence (510(k) review) or premarket approval (PMA).26
1. PREMARKET APPROVAL VS. SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE
A Class III device cannot receive PMA approval until the FDA
determines that the manufacturer's application contains "sufficient valid
scientific evidence to assure that the device is safe and effective for its
intended use(s)."2 7 The burden is on the manufacturer to provide the
necessary information for the FDA's review. 8 The application is highly
involved, often containing multiple volumes of information ranging
from technical data to proposed labeling.29 As a result of the significant
amount of information contained in a PMA application, the FDA typi-
cally spends about 1,200 hours reviewing each application.3"
Not all Class III devices are required to obtain PMA approval.3 ' If
the FDA deems a device substantially equivalent to a legally marketed
device, PMA approval is not required.32 Instead, the manufacturer need
only submit a 510(k) notification, which requires it to identify the com-
parable device, describe the applicant device's function and physical
characteristics, and state the intended use of the applicant device.33 The
purpose of this provision is to allow manufacturers to introduce "me
too" devices and to discourage monopolies within the medical-device
market.34 In contrast to the PMA, a 510(k) review typically requires
twenty hours.35 These distinctions would later form the basis for the
Court's different approaches to preemption in Lohr and Riegel.36
26. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477-78 (1996) (noting two exceptions to the
PMA requirement for Class III devices-a "grandfathering provision" for existing, pre-MDA
devices and substantial equivalence for devices seeking to enter the market).
27. FDA, supra note 2; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1)(A) (noting that the FDA Secretary's
disposition of the application is based on "whether or not there is a reasonable assurance of safety
and effectiveness").
28. See § 360e(d)(2)(A)-(B) (indicating that the FDA will deny a PMA application if the
information provided by the applicant fails to demonstrate reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness).
29. 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2009).
30. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1004 (2008).
31. FDA, supra note 2.
32. Id.
33. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a) (2009).
34. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 n.14 (1996) ("[T]he 510(k) provision ... is a
procompetition mechanism that permits firms to make and quickly market me-too versions of pre-
1976 devices." (quoting FDA Oversight: Medical Devices, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 9
(1982) (statement of FDA Commn'r))).
35. Id. at 479.
36. See discussion infra Part III.
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2. PREEMPTION UNDER THE MDA
The MDA contains a specific preemption provision, codified at 21
U.S.C. § 360k(a):
[N]o State ... may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement-(1) which is differ-
ent from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effective-
ness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under this chapter.
The FDA interpreted the scope of this preemption provision as follows:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and
Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations
or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular
device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or
local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addi-
tion to, the specific [FDA] requirements.37
This regulation did little to help clarify the MDA's preemptive
scope, and the legislative history of the MDA was silent on the issue.38
This silence led to increasing debate regarding whether its preemptive
scope was limited to the state regulatory schemes that proliferated before
the MDA or extended to common-law tort suits like Riegel and Lohr.39
A closer look at the legislative history indicates that the MDA's
aim was dual in nature, with "two strong, but sometimes conflicting,
interests"-the device industry's interest in scientific progress and con-
sumers' interest in safe devices.4° Congress acknowledged these com-
peting aims, noting that the MDA "recognizes the benefits that medical
...devices offer[ ] to mankind. It recognizes, too, the need for regula-
tion to assure that the public is protected .... "" These competing aims
inevitably clash in the preemption context where courts must choose
between protecting consumers' interest in ensuring medical-device
safety and protecting manufacturers' interest in regulatory uniformity.42
This analysis becomes even more complex because it is unclear whether
37. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2009) (emphasis added).
38. See Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts
Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REv. 895, 924 (1994) ("[T]here is no absolutely dispositive language in the
MDA regarding preemption and the common law.").
39. See generally id.
40. Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Meeting the Objectives of the MDA: Implied Preemption of
State Tort Claims by the Medical Device Amendments, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 343, 349 (1995-96).
41. S. Rep. No. 94-33, at 6 (1975).
42. See Radwan, supra note 40, at 350 (permitting tort actions supports Congress's aim to
shield consumers from risk, while preempting tort actions supports Congress's aim to prevent
overregulation through varied state tort schemes).
[Vol. 64:305
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Congress intended the tort scheme to protect the public from unsafe
devices.
C. Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence
Any preemption analysis is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution,43 and the doctrine has been judicially recog-
nized for nearly two centuries.' The scope of the federal government's
power to preempt is broadly stated in the Constitution, but the Supreme
Court has limited its reach by creating a presumption against preemption
in areas of law typically governed by the states. In Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp.," the Court noted that its preemption analysis should
"start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress."46 Congress can articulate its mani-
fest purpose through an express statutory provision,47 as it did with the
MDA,48 or courts can find implied preemption49 based on the pervasive-
ness of the federal regulation, the scope of the federal government's
interest, or a specific conflict between state and federal law.5"
One case in particular, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,5  marked a
shift in the Court's view on whether express statutory preemption
applied to state tort claims.52 The Court had rarely preempted these
claims before it construed the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
196913 in Cipollone.54 The Act's preemption provision states, "No
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of
43. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.").
44. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("[S]ince our decision in
M'Culloch v. Maryland, it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without
effect."' (citation omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981))).
45. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
46. Id. at 230.
47. This form of preemption if typically referred to as express preemption. STARR ET AL.,
supra note 15.
48. The MDA's preemption provision is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
49. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
50. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
51. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
52. See THOMAS 0. McGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR 49-51 (2008).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2006).
54. MCGARITY, supra note 52, at 51; see Gail H. Javitt, Esq., I've Got You Under My Skin
And I Can't Get Redress: An Analysis of Recent Case Law Addressing Preemption of
Manufacturer Liability for Class III Medical Devices, 40 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 553, 566 (describing
Cipollone as "[t]he key authority stating the rule for preemption of state law claims" (quoting
Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (C.D. Cal. 1994))).
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any cigarettes . . . .", In concluding that this preemption statement
applied to tort claims, a plurality of the Court placed particular emphasis
on Congress's use of the phrase "requirements or prohibitions. 56
"[C]ommon-law damages actions ... are premised on the existence of a
legal duty, and it is difficult to say that such actions do not impose
'requirements or prohibitions.' ,5 7 This contention would later play an
important role in Riegel and Lohr.58
D. Judicial Interpretation of Preemption Under the MDA
Few courts had considered the MDA's preemptive scope until the
early 1990s, 59 and the Supreme Court had yet to reach the issue.60 Not
surprisingly, preemption jurisprudence was in disarray, with courts
reaching widely varied results. 61 Courts turned to Cipollone for gui-
dance62 but could not agree on its meaning.
Although a majority of the Cipollone Court did not agree that state
tort law constituted requirements, this aspect of Cipollone's analysis
("the Cipollone proposition") nonetheless trickled down to some lower
courts.6 3 Just one year after Cipollone was decided, King v. Collagen
Corp.'4 became the first case to accept the preemption defense in the
MDA context.65 King relied heavily on Cipollone in determining that the
express language of the MDA required preemption of state tort claims.66
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
56. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion) (noting "substantial differences in
language" between the statutory phrases "statements" and "requirements and prohibitions").
57. Id. at 522.
58. In Lohr, five Justices agreed with the Cipollone proposition that state tort claims were
requirements within preemption analysis. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 504 (1996)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part); id. at 512 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J, Scalia and Thomas, JJ.). The Riegel Court noted the Lohr Court's approach and summarily
affirmed the Cipollone proposition. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007-08 (2008)
(citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522); see discussion infra Part III.
59. Vladeck, supra note 17, at 105.
60. See Radwan, supra note 40, at 355 (noting that the United States Supreme Court had not
interpreted the MDA's preemptive effect on state tort law until Lohr).
61. Leflar & Adler, supra note 11, at 692; see Lohr, 518 U.S. at 484 (noting the circuit split);
see also cases cited infra notes 68-70 (providing specific examples of the circuit split).
62. There is some authority indicating that lower courts should not have applied Cipollone in
the MDA context. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 489 (plurality opinion) (distinguishing the MDA from the
statute at issue in Cipollone).
63. See McGARrry, supra note 52, at 49 ("[Cipollone] opened the door to expansive common
law preemption claims... that precipitated the preemption war."); Leflar & Adler, supra note I1,
at 698 ("The Cipollone Court's interpretation of the word 'requirement' . . . provided a
springboard for subsequent courts to hold injured consumers' claims preempted under other
statutes.").
64. 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
65. Javitt, supra note 54, at 554.
66. See King, 983 F.2d at 1137.
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But the circuit courts were not uniform in their application of Cipollone
to the MDA. Three different approaches emerged:67 (1) all tort claims
were preempted by the MDA;68 (2) only some tort claims were pre-
empted, often depending on FDA regulations;69 or (3) the MDA was not
intended to preempt tort claims at all.70
1. THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST LOOK AT MDA PREEMPTION:
MEDTRONIC, INC. V. LOHR
In 1996, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the dispute among
the circuits. 7' The Court's analysis centered on the meaning of the
MDA's statutory phrase "requirement."72 The Lohr Court addressed two
main issues: (1) whether the substantial equivalence § 510(k) approval
process constitutes a "federal requirement" within the meaning of the
MDA,73 and (2) whether the MDA preempts all common-law causes of
action against medical-device manufacturers.74
On the first issue, the Court held that the § 510(k) process was "not
sufficiently concrete to constitute a pre-empting federal requirement.
7 5
It viewed the § 5 10(k) process as merely focusing on the device's equiv-
alence to pre-MDA devices, rather than on safety.76 The Court also said
that federal requirements must be "device-specific" in order to have pre-
emptive effect.77 This analysis set the stage for the Riegel Court's
67. Mark E. Gelsinger, Note, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Is Federal Pre-emption a Heartbeat
Away from Death Under the Medical Device Amendments?, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 647, 664-67 (1998).
68. The First Circuit was the primary proponent of this broad view of preemption, which was
based on the conclusion that state tort claims were requirements within the meaning of the MDA.
See Talbot v. C.R. Band, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 27 (Ist Cir. 1995) (noting that in multiple cases, the
First Circuit had found that state tort laws were "requirements" and therefore subject to
preemption under the MDA (citing King, 983 F.2d at 1135-37; Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18
F.3d 13, 16 (Ist Cir. 1994))).
69. The Fifth Circuit is an example of this intermediate approach. See Stamps v. Collagen
Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that preemption applies if, "in the context of
the particular case," the tort claim constitutes a requirement relating to safety or effectiveness
(emphasis added)).
70. The Ninth Circuit appears to be the only circuit that narrowly construed the MDA
preemption provision. See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1459 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995)
("[T]he MDA does not preempt claims based upon state common law of general applicability"
therefore limiting the preemption provision to state regulatory regimes).
71. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 474 (1996) ("Because the Courts of Appeals
are divided over the extent to which state common-law claims are pre-empted by the MDA, we
granted [certiorari].").
72. See Vladeck, supra note 17, at 98 ("[T]he crucial interpretive question [in medical device
preemption cases] is what does the word 'requirement' mean?").
73. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 492-93.
74. Id. at 486-91 (plurality opinion).
75. Id. at 492 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 493.
77. Id. at 497-500 (holding that manufacturing and labeling requirements that were generally
applied to all devices were not device-specific and therefore not preempted).
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analysis.
Regarding the second issue, a four-Justice plurality78 rejected Med-
tronic's argument that the MDA preempted all common-law claims. 9
Relying heavily on Congress's intent, the plurality characterized this
assertion as "unpersuasive [and] implausible" because it would "have
the perverse effect of granting complete immunity from design defect
liability to an entire industry that, in the judgment of Congress, needed
more stringent regulation."80
Given its holding that § 510(k) approval did not impose federal
requirements, the Court was not required to reach an important third
issue-whether state common-law actions constituted "state require-
ments" under the MDA.81 Nonetheless, the Justices provided glimpses
into their respective stances. In determining that the MDA did not pre-
clude all common-law suits, the Stevens plurality noted that "when Con-
gress enacted §360k, it was primarily concerned with the problem of
specific, conflicting state statutes and regulations rather than the general
duties enforced by common-law actions.""2 Four Justices, led by Justice
O'Connor, reached the opposite conclusion: that state common-law
actions do constitute "requirements, 83 relying on Cipollone as the basis
for this interpretation. Justice Breyer, in a separate concurring opinion,
agreed with the O'Connor cohort on this point.84 O'Connor's interpreta-
tion would later shape the Riegel Court's view of the Cipollone
proposition.
Lohr's holding rested not on its interpretation of "state require-
ments," but rather on the "federal requirements" prong of the MDA.
This reliance on "federal requirements" allowed the Lohr Court to
resolve the specific question regarding the preemptive effect of the sub-
stantial equivalence process but avoid the Cipollone proposition that had
been a source of division among the circuits.85 So in effect, Lohr had
little impact on clarifying the applicability of the Cipollone proposition
to MDA preemption cases.
78. The plurality was led by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Souter.
79. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487 (plurality opinion).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 502 (noting the plaintiffs argument that "common-law duties are never
'requirements' within the meaning of § 360k, and that the statute therefore never pre-empts
common-law actions," but refusing to directly address the issue).
82. Id. at 489. The plurality also distinguished the statute at issue in Cippollone, noting
"significant textual and historical differences." Id. at 502.
83. Id. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
85. See discussion supra Part l.D.
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2. LOHR'S AFTERMATH
Although the Lohr holding seemed simple enough-the MDA did
not preempt tort claims against manufacturers that obtained substantial
equivalence approval-lower courts struggled with its application to
PMA-approved devices.86 The example most illustrative of this struggle
is the litigation surrounding a Medtronic cardiac pacemaker with an
allegedly defective component part (a Model 4004/M lead). The Elev-
enth Circuit determined that claims against this manufacturer were not
preempted,87 but the Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion
regarding the exact same device.8" Thus, one injured plaintiff was able
to bring a claim, while another plaintiff-injured by the same device, in
a different jurisdiction-was unable to sue the manufacturer.
The time had come for the Supreme Court to address the unan-
swered questions that remained after Lohr:8 9 (1) whether the PMA pro-
cess constituted a federal requirement within the meaning of the MDA 90
and (2) whether common-law duties were state requirements within the
meaning of the MDA. 91 In Riegel, the Court answered each question in
the affirmative, first holding that the PMA process (unlike 510(k)
review) did constitute federal requirements within the meaning of the
86. See Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 224 (6th Cir. 2000) ('The various courts of
appeals that have confronted issues of preemption arising under the MDA have struggled mightily
with Lohr's language in the effort to discern its holding."); Vladeck, supra note 17, at 109 (noting
a division among courts regarding the MDA's preemptive effect in the PMA context).
87. Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1382 (1 1th Cir. 1999). In determining that the
claims were not preempted, the court reasoned that "while a PMA review is considerably more
rigorous and detailed than the premarket notification [510k] process at issue in [Lohr v.]
Medtronic, it is, in fact, no more 'specific' a requirement." Id. at 1376 (alterations in original)
(quoting Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 656 N.Y.S. 2d 16, 20 (App. Div. 1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
88. Kemp, 231 F.3d at 226 (noting the court's disagreement with Goodlin and holding that the
PMA process is a federal requirement that preempts state tort law.)
89. The Court had rejected multiple opportunities to clarify these looming questions in the
years after Lohr. See McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005) (preempting a
post-sale failure to warn claim against the manufacturer of a device that passed PMA scrutiny),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1003 (2006); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 2001)
("Medtronic's compliance with the Food and Drug Administration's . .. rigorous premarket
approval procedure ... [preempts] the plaintiffs' Texas common law products liability tort
claims."), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002); Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir.
2000) (finding that the PMA process constituted a federal requirement under the MDA), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 818 (2001); Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Kernats, 669 N.E.2d 1300 (111. App.
Ct. 1996) (refusing to preempt tort claims against a manufacturer of a Class III device approved
through the PMA process), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998), overruled by Weiland v.
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1149 (I11. 1999).
90. The Court took up this question in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1006 (2008).
91. In Lohr, the Court left open the question of whether the MDA preemption clause applies
to state common law, but a plurality noted that such situations "will be rare indeed." Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 502-03 (1996) (plurality opinion).
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MDA. The Court then concluded that common-law tort duties were state
requirements subject to preemption by the MDA.
III. IN THE SHADOWS OF LOHR: RIEGEL v. MEDTRONIC, INC.
As noted previously, the Lohr Court decided not to preempt tort
claims based on its determination that the § 510(k) process had not
established "device-specific" requirements.92 The Riegel Court used this
framework to reach a different result by distinguishing the PMA process
from § 510(k) review. 93 These differences, which formed the basis for
the different outcomes in Lohr and Riegel, can be described as the "Rie-
gel distinction."
Ultimately, there can be no doubt that the PMA process differs
from the § 510(k) process-the key distinction being the nature and
extent of the review. The PMA process evaluates the device on its own
merits, whereas substantial equivalence looks at the device in compari-
son to other devices. 94 The question is whether this distinction forms a
sufficient basis for a different preemption rule.
A. Drawing a Line in the Sand: Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
1. THE "RIEGEL DISTINCTION": THE PMA PROCESS IS A
FEDERAL REQUIREMENT
First, the Court addressed whether the PMA process is a "federal
requirement" under the MDA. Riegel relied extensively on the analysis
set forth in Lohr,95 which established the device-specific requirement of
MDA preemption analysis.96 In Lohr, the Court characterized the
§ 510(k) process as a simple equivalence review that merely compares
the new device to a pre-MDA device.97 The Riegel Court agreed with
this assessment and further characterized the § 510(k) process as merely
"a qualification for an exemption [from the PMA requirement].""
In distinguishing the PMA process, the Riegel Court characterized
it as "a rigorous process" that required multiple volumes of detailed
data.99 The Court discussed the FDA's time-intensive review process,
l °°
92. See discussion supra Part II.D.I.
93. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1006-07.
94. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493.
95. Lohr is the only case cited in the Riegel Court's analysis of the contours of "federal
requirement" within the meaning of the MDA. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1006-07.
96. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500 (determining that only federal requirements that are "applicable
to the device" have preemptive effect).
97. Id. at 493.
98. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1007.
99. Id. at 1004 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. See id. ("The FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours reviewing each application ... .
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which requires the agency to "weig[h] any probable benefit to health
from the use of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness
from such use." 10 1 Finally, the Riegel Court placed particular emphasis
on the PMA's focus on safety.11
2
But any device approved by the FDA, regardless of which approval
process it undergoes, has the potential to harm consumers. As noted by a
former Chief Counsel to the FDA, "[e]ven the most thorough regulation
of a product such as a critical medical device may fail to identify poten-
tial problems presented by the product."10 3 Although the FDA devotes
more resources to reviewing PMA applications than it does to § 510(k)
notifications," ° it does not necessarily follow that PMA-approved
devices are categorically safer than substantially equivalent devices.
"Devices subject to the premarket approval process ... tend to be more
technologically advanced, expensive, and in some instances, risky.' 0 5
This suggests that the potential for dangerous and unsafe devices may in
fact be higher among PMA-approved devices, despite the FDA's more
expansive review. Additionally, the FDA has its fair share of resource
challenges' °6 and questionable decisions, t° 7 which undermine the pub-
lic's trust in the depth and quality of the agency's product reviews."°8
Further, it is debatable whether the PMA process, standing alone,
establishes "device-specific requirements" as required for preemption
under the MDA. Even the federal government has taken contradictory
positions in this debate. In 1997, soon after the Court decided Lohr, the
101. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C) (2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
102. See id. at 1007 ("[P]remarket approval is focused on safety, not equivalence.... [T]he
FDA may grant premarket approval only after it determines that a device offers a reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness." (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006))).
103. Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 7, 11 (1997).
104. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 479 (noting that the FDA spends 1,200 hours reviewing a PMA
application but only twenty hours conducting a § 510(k) review).
105. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Shield Medical Devices from Lawsuits, N.Y. Tiis, Feb. 21,
2008, at Al.
106. See Terry Carter, The Pre-emption Prescription, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2008, at 42, 47
(characterizing the FDA as "understaffed, underfunded and outgunned by the industries it
regulates").
107. See SusAN BARTLETT FOOTE, MANAGING THE MEDICAL ARMS RACE: PUBLIC POLICY AND
MEDICAL DEVICE INNOVATION 136 (1992) (noting that Congress "has sharply and regularly
criticized the FDA for underregulation and failure to enforce regulatory standards"); Suzanne
Cook, et al., Supreme Court Preview: Riegel v. Medtronic (06-179), FED. LAW., Feb. 2008, at 61,
62 (referencing a survey that determined that sixty percent of "FDA scientists knew of cases in
which commercial interests had influenced FDA approval").
108. See Carter, supra note 106, at 47 (noting that the FDA process "depends on a widespread
trust in the system that has been wavering in recent years").
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government filed an amicus brief in a case similar to Riegel. " There,
the government expressed its belief that "the agency's decision to grant
... [a] PMA ... did not establish specific federal requirements within
the meaning of Section 360k." 1"0 Just ten years later in Riegel, the gov-
ernment completely reversed course.'" This inconsistency within the
government's own interpretation of "federal requirements" supports the
conclusion that the meaning of this phrase is far from clear.
In holding that § 510(k) was not a "federal requirement," the Lohr
Court determined that the process "did not 'require' [the manufacturer's
device] to take any particular form."" ' 2 However, the same could be said
of the PMA process. 1 3 For example, the FDA can take one of four sepa-
rate actions with any PMA: (1) issue an approval order, (2) issue an
approvable letter, (3) issue a not approvable letter, or (4) issue an order
denying the application." 4 In the first situation, the FDA approves the
application as submitted and makes only "minor" or "editorial" changes
to the device label.' 1 5 Since the manufacturer bears the burden of pro-
viding the substantive device specifications," 6 the FDA does not pro-
vide any substantive input into the device's design when it merely issues
an approval order;" 7 thus, it is unlikely that the FDA has imposed any
''requirement."
In contrast, a not approvable letter "identif[ies] measures required
to place the PMA in approvable form.""' 8 Similarly, an approvable letter
specifically describes the information that the applicant must provide to
gain approval.' 9 These conditional approvals appear more in line with
109. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Smith Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Kemats, 522
U.S. 1044 (1997) (No. 96-1405), 1997 WL 33561767.
110. Id. at 14 (characterizing the PMA as the FDA's indication "that the manufacturer had
complied with the applicable federal minimum standards for use and marketing").
I 1. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8, Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179), 2007 WL 3231418 ("[P]remarket approval of
a Class III device imposes specific federal requirements . . .and thus has preemptive effect.").
112. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 493 (1996).
113. But see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007 (2008) (noting that substantially
equivalent devices are not required to "take any particular form for any particular reason," but
distinguishing the PMA process because the manufacturer cannot deviate from the FDA-approved
formulation (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493)).
114. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(c) (2009).
115. Id. § 814.44(d)(1).
116. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2006) (indicating that the FDA will deny a PMA
application if the information provided by the applicant fails to demonstrate reasonable assurance
of safety and effectiveness).
117. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(d)(1) (noting that the device will be approved if the sole
deficiency in the application relates to "editorial or similar minor deficiencies in the draft final
labeling").
118. Id. § 814.44(0.
119. Id. § 814.44(e).
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the preemptive "device-specific requirements" contemplated by Lohr.1 20
Further, the FDA's interpretive regulation demands that only "specific
requirements applicable to a particular device" have preemptive
effect. 12 ' This regulation has been interpreted as requiring "the imposi-
tion of some identifiable precondition that applies to the device in
question." 122
Justice Ginsburg provided two specific examples of such a situation
at oral argument in Riegel.123 Where the FDA denies a manufacturer's
request to make a specific safety improvement, a tort suit premised on
the manufacturer's failure to make that improvement would likely be
preempted.1 24 Another likely example of a federally imposed require-
ment is where the FDA conditions premarket approval on the inclusion
of X, but a future lawsuit claims that X caused the device to become
unreasonably dangerous.
25
These examples demonstrate that situations do indeed exist where
the FDA has promulgated preemptive federal requirements within the
meaning of the MDA; otherwise the regulation's reference to "federal
requirements" would be superfluous. But these examples also lead to the
question: is a bright-line rule, such as the "Riegel distinction," appropri-
ate in MDA preemption jurisprudence? In an express preemption analy-
sis, "appropriateness" depends on whether Congress intended such a
distinction.1 26 On the one hand, by conditioning preemption on the depth
of the FDA's review, the Court arguably meets the congressional objec-
tive of balancing the risks of the device against the benefits.' 27 Congress
certainly recognized and accounted for the varying degrees of risk asso-
ciated with medical devices. 28 But on the other hand, it did not recog-
nize any categorical distinction between the risks associated with
substantially equivalent devices and the risks associated with PMA-
120. These examples would likely cause to the courts to become bogged down in a
cumbersome analysis of each and every FDA review of the various medical devices. They are not
proffered as a solution to the MDA preemption quagmire but merely illustrate the inherent
problems with the "Riegel distinction."
121. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
122. Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1374 (11 th Cir. 1999).
123. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-17, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999
(2008) (No. 06-179).
124. See id. at 13.
125. See id. at 16.
126. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996) ("[A]ny understanding of the
scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on 'a fair understanding of congressional
purpose."' (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530 n.27 (1992))).
127. See S. REp. No. 94-33, at 6 (1975) (discussing the need for regulation to protect
consumers, while also encouraging medical research).
128. See id. at 10 (recommending that "all medical devices be classified into one of three
categories based upon the degree of risk to the public health and safety represented by each
individual device or class of devices").
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approved devices.' 29 And the MDA's preemption provision is silent on
the matter. 130 Thus the justification for the bright-line rule established by
the "Riegel distinction" seems to lie beyond the text of the MDA and
congressional intent.
2. THE CIPOLLONE PROPOSITION, AGAIN?: COMMON-LAW CLAIMS
ARE STATE REQUIREMENTS
After resolving the "federal requirements" issue, the Riegel Court
addressed whether state tort law is a "state requirement" under the
MDA. In contrast to the Lohr Court, which was not required to reach
this issue,' 3 1 the Riegel Court needed to tackle the issue head on.
"[C]ommon-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability do
impose 'requirement[s]' and would be preempted by federal require-
ments specific to a medical device."' 132 Riegel relied on Lohr's concur-
ring and dissenting opinions, which represented the views of five
Justices, to support this proposition. 33 Riegel also cited Cipollone, as
well as another express preemption case (Bates v. Dow Agrosciences,
LLC), 34 where the Court had interpreted the statutory phrase "require-
ment" to include common-law actions. 35 Justice Scalia noted that Con-
gress "regularly used" the term "requirement" in its enactments.
136
Indeed, the two preemption statutes in Cipollone and Bates each
contain the phrase "requirement,"'' 37 as does the MDA.138 However,
129. For example, the devices at issue in Riegel and Lohr were both Class III devices-the
class associated with the most risk-even though one device reached the market through the
§ 510(k) process and the other through the PMA process.
130. The preemption statute, 21 U.S.C. § 360k, merely makes a general reference to
"requirement." The statute only preempts state requirements that are: (1) "different from, or in
addition to" federal requirements and (2) "related to the safety or effectiveness of the device." 21
U.S.C. § 360k(a)(l)-(2) (2006).
131. See discussion supra Part II.D. I.
132. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007 (2008) (second alteration in original).
133. See id. (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 512 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 503-505 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
134. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
135. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1007-08.
136. Id. at 1008.
137. The statute at issue in Cipollone states, "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter." 15
U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006) (emphasis added). The statute at issue in Bates provides, "[A] State shall
not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging [of a federally
registered pesticide or device] in addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter." 7 U.S.C. §136v(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
138. The MDA's preemption provision states "[N]o State ... may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement" that is different from the
federal requirement regarding safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. §360k(a) (2006) (emphasis
added).
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neither Cipollone nor Bates involved the MDA. 139 Therefore, it should
not be assumed that "requirement" has the same meaning in all three
statutes.
Although the Court has often held that "identical words and phrases
within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning,"14
there does not appear to be any comparable presumption in regards to
words used in different statutes. Rather, in a recent case involving statu-
tory construction, the Supreme Court noted that "[m]ost words have dif-
ferent shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed
... when they occur in different statutes."' 41 Certainly, this statement
cannot be deemed a prohibition against Justice Scalia's rationale in Rie-
gel, given the Court's use of the phrase "may be variously construed."' 42
However, the Court's instruction on statutory interpretation, at the very
least, calls into question Riegel's strong reliance on Cipollone and Bates.
Further, the legislative history of the MDA belies the Riegel
Court's expansive interpretation of state requirements. Riegel seemed to
imply that the MDA's legislative history lacked any evidence of Con-
gress's intent to exclude common-law claims from the meaning of "state
requirements."'' 43 But the Lohr plurality had previously noted that "the
legislative history [of the MDA] indicates that any fears regarding regu-
latory burdens were related more to the risk of additional federal and
state regulation rather than the danger of pre-existing duties under com-
mon law."' 14 4 In passing the MDA, Congress specifically took note of
state-established, medical-device regulatory regimes that existed before
139. Cipollone required the Court to interpret the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 510
(1992). Bates required the Court to interpret the Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136. Bates, 544 U.S. at 434.
140. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007) (noting that this
interpretation is a "standard principle of statutory construction"). Courts may infer different
interpretations of the same word within a statute when warranted by the context of the statute. See
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 575-76 (2007) ("There is ... no 'effectively
irrebuttable' presumption that the same defined term in different provisions of the same statute
must 'be interpreted identically.' Context counts." (quoting United States v. Duke Energy Corp.,
411 F.3d 539, 550 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated sub nom., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S.
561 (2007))).
141. EnvtL Def., 549 U.S. at 574 (2007) (8-1 decision) (first alteration in original) (quoting Atl.
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Ironically, Justice Scalia was among the eight Justices who joined this opinion, despite
reasoning in Riegel that "requirement" had the same meaning in three unrelated statutes.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) ("Absent other indication,
reference to a State's 'requirements' includes its common-law duties." (emphasis added)). Riegel
could be read broadly as supporting the proposition that any statute referencing "state
requirements" includes state common law.
144. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 490 (1996) (plurality opinion).
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the implementation of the MDA and determined that such regimes
would burden interstate commerce. 145 Thus, the legislative history indi-
cates Congress's intent to preempt these regimes rather than common
law. 1
46
3. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED PREEMPTION?
Riegel claims to derive preemption authority from the statute
itself,'4 7 but the "Riegel distinction" appears to be devoid of any support
in the text of the statute or in congressional intent. In the absence of
clear direction from Congress, the proper basis for the "Riegel distinc-
tion" may lie more appropriately in implied preemption. Courts typically
conduct this analysis when congressional intent is unclear. 48 However,
the Court is divided over whether the existence of an express preemption
provision precludes the Court from conducting implied preemption
analysis. 149
At least three forms of implied preemption are generally recog-
nized: (1) actual conflict preemption is limited to circumstances where
the state law directly conflicts with the federal law; (2) obstacle preemp-
tion occurs when "imposition of the state liability will frustrate the ends
of the federal statute"; and (3) field preemption occurs where the federal
scheme is so pervasive that preemption can be reasonably inferred.
50
The analysis in Riegel seems to draw from some of these implied
preemption principles. For example, in a field preemption analysis,
145. See Adler & Mann, supra note 38, at 924 n.131 (noting Congress's recognition that "a
substantial number of differing requirements ... imposed by jurisdictions other than the Federal
government" would unduly burden interstate commerce (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 45
(1976) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
146. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[S]tate premarket regulation of
medical devices, not any design to suppress tort suits, accounts for Congress' inclusion of a
preemption clause in the MDA."); Vladeck, supra note 17, at 104-105 (suggesting that the
MDA's preemption provision was aimed at state regulatory regimes, which Congress allowed the
states to maintain until the FDA promulgated regulations).
147. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009.
148. Radwan, supra note 40, at 352. The clarity of the statute, of course, is debatable. See
discussion infra Part IH.B.1.
149. The Cipollone majority noted, "When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption
and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when
that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,
there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive
provisions of the legislation." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The only current Justices who joined this part of the
opinion are Justices Stevens and Kennedy. Justices Scalia and Thomas rejected this new rule
noting that "we have never expressed such a rule before, and our prior cases are inconsistent with
it." Id. at 547-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Apparently, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue since Cipollone.
150. Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 Nw.
U. L. REv. COLLOQuY 54, 55 (2008); see also STARR ET AL., supra note 15, at 18-30.
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courts evaluate whether the "scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive" to reasonably infer no room for state regulation. 51 By
relying principally on the depth of the FDA approval process, 5 2 Riegel
and Lohr appear to be evaluating the pervasiveness of the federal
scheme. 153 Even the examples of likely preemption that Justice Ginsburg
raised during the Riegel oral argument 154 involved issues of implied pre-
emption, because the device manufacturer would be unable to comply
with the federal and state requirements simultaneously, which raises an
actual conflict.
The Riegel majority's analysis of the state law's impact on the fed-
eral regulatory scheme also points to an implied preemption analysis.
When the Court determined that "[s]tate tort law ... disrupts the federal
scheme,' ' 55 its language mirrored that of several implied preemption
cases.'5 6 But Justice Scalia refused to embrace any hint of implied pre-
emption in Riegel, asserting that the statute was clear and unambigu-
ous. 57 The Riegel Court evaluated the jury's ability to determine the
safety and effectiveness of medical devices and concluded that the FDA
was superior in that regard. 158  At oral arguments, Justice Scalia
expressed his concern that "the jury is doing the same thing that the
FDA did."'159 At oral arguments, Justice Kennedy expressed his concern
that "the jury is doing the same thing that the FDA did" and questioned
whether "the finder of fact weigh[ed] the potential risks of injury and
illness against the probable benefits to the health of the patient" when
deciding a negligence claim. 6 ' Ultimately, the Riegel Court concluded
151. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1986).
152. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1006-07; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 493 (1996).
153. Field preemption likely would not sweep as broadly as the Court did in Riegel, because it
rarely applies to state common-law claims. MCGARrrY, supra note 52, at 52. The MDA likely
precludes field preemption analysis because "[t]he existence of an express pre-emption provision
tends to contradict any inference that Congress intended to occupy a field broader than the
statute's express language defines." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
154. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
155. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
156. The Court impliedly preempted a state statute that was in tension with the National Labor
Relations Act after determining that the statute was "disruptive" to the "complex and interrelated
federal scheme." Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
286 (1986) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court impliedly preempted a state regulation
that "disturb[ed] the uniformity of the federal scheme." Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State
Gas and Oil Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 423 (1986) (emphasis added).
157. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009 (noting that the Court relied only on the statute's text,
which "speaks clearly").
158. See id. at 1008 (noting the jury's limited ability to conduct a proper cost-benefit analysis
of the medical device).
159. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179), 2007 WL
4241897.
160. Id. at 6.
20091
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
that the jury's disposition of the case "disrupts the federal scheme no
less than state regulatory law to the same effect."'
6
1
As a policy matter, these observations may be true; but they are
more properly directed to an implied preemption analysis than an
express preemption analysis. 1 62 When evaluating an ambiguous preemp-
tion statute, "the Court has generally required clear evidence of legisla-
tive intent to preempt state law." 163 In Riegel, that evaluation would
require clear evidence that Congress intended to preempt state tort law.
However, there appears to be nothing in the MDA or in the legisla-
tive history that would support this level of preemption. 164 The Lohr
plurality concluded as much when it failed to find "[any]thing in the
hearings, the Committee Reports, or the debates suggesting that any pro-
ponent of the [MDA] intended a sweeping pre-emption of traditional
common-law remedies against manufacturers and distributors of defec-
tive devices."' 165 Since Lohr and Riegel interpret the same statute, the
Lohr Court's analysis leads to the inference that the MDA is not suffi-
ciently clear as to Congress's intent regarding the preemption of state
tort claims. Therefore, if the "Riegel distinction" is appropriate, its basis
appears to derive from implied preemption.
166
B. Conflicting Legal and Analytical Underpinnings: Riegel vs. Lohr
Riegel and Lohr cannot be reconciled because of the paramount
differences in the foundational concepts underlying each Court's ratio-
nale. First, the Riegel and Lohr Courts appear to fundamentally disagree
over the ambiguity, or lack thereof, of the MDA. 6 7 Second, the Riegel
Court largely rejected two key provisions that anchored Lohr's holding:
"the 'ultimate touchstone' in every preemption case"' 168 (congressional
intent) and the fundamental presumption against preemption. 169 The two
161. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
162. See Sharkey, supra note 14, at 423 (noting that analysis of the conflict between the roles
of the FDA and the jury "could prove influential, if not dispositive, in resolving implied conflict
preemption disputes"). In an implied preemption case, the defendant manufacturer raised similar
arguments to those set forth by the Riegel majority. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194
(2009) (noting Wyeth's argument that state tort law "substitutes a lay jury's decision ... for the
expert judgment of the FDA").
163. STARR ET AL., supra note 15, at 16.
164. Adler & Mann, supra note 38, at 924.
165. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 491 (1996) (plurality opinion).
166. This article principally critiques the rationale set forth by the Court in Riegel and takes no
specific position on whether the MDA is so pervasive as to preempt state tort claims against
manufacturers or whether state liability stands as an obstacle to the MDA.
167. See discussion infra Section III.B.I.
168. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)
and citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
169. See discussion infra Section 11.B.2-3.
[Vol. 64:305
IN THE SHADOWS OF LOHR
opinions also differ in the amount of deference each is willing to accord
the FDA. 
170
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE SCOPE OF EXPRESS
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The fundamental rift over the meaning of state requirements is
rooted in the debate over statutory construction, particularly whether the
Court should resort to congressional intent.1 71 When interpreting a stat-
ute, the Court must first determine "whether the language at issue has a
plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in
the case." 172 Riegel and Lohr reached opposite conclusions on this
important issue.1 73 The Riegel majority saw no need to go beyond the
four corners of the statute,174 while the Lohr Court viewed the statute as
ambiguous. 175 A finding of statutory ambiguity is often a precursor to
the Court's use of interpretive tools such as legislative history and
agency interpretations.
176
These rules of statutory construction appear to inform the Riegel
Court's interpretation of the MDA's preemption provision. It is well set-
tled that any express preemption analysis must begin with the text of the
preemption provision contained within the statute.177 Cipollone further
instructed that express preemption provisions should be construed nar-
rowly. 178 In his dissent in Cipollone, Justice Scalia rejected the major-
ity's narrow construction rule and proclaimed, "The proper rule of
construction for express preemption provisions is . . . the one that is
170. See discussion infra Section llI.B.4.
171. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S Ct. 999, 1009 (2008) (rejecting speculation about
congressional intent); id. at 1016-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (relying heavily on congressional
intent).
172. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
173. See Sharkey, supra note 14, at 415 n.4 (contrasting Justice Scalia's assertion in Riegel that
"'the statute itself speaks clearly to the point at issue'" with the Lohr Court's assertion that the
statute had substantial ambiguity (quoting Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009 and citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at
496)).
174. See id.
175. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 489 (plurality opinion) (citing the "ambiguities in the statute" as a
reason to reject preemption of all common-law causes of action); id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and in the judgment) (characterizing the MDA's preemption provision as "highly
ambiguous").
176. CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AmERICAN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 31-32 (2002). However, preemption analysis appears to be an exception to this
rule. See id. at 32 (noting that preemption analysis is a "special circumstance[ ] in which the Court
will consult legislative history").
177. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 484; CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) ("If the
statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first
instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress' pre-emptive intent.").
178. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992).
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customary for statutory provisions in general: Their language should be
given its ordinary meaning." 179
In keeping with this view of statutory construction, Justice Scalia
relied primarily on a text-based interpretation of the MDA in Riegel.'8 °
He specifically rejected any intimation that anything other than the text
was necessary to interpret the statute. 8' Lohr's approach to statutory
interpretation was sharply different. Lohr was heavily guided by con-
gressional intent 82 and the FDA's interpretation of the MDA. 183 The
Lohr Court specifically rejected a solely text-based interpretation, noting
that "[a]lthough our analysis of the scope of the preemption statute must
begin with its text, our interpretation of that language does not occur in a
contextual vacuum."'1
84
These differences illustrate a larger problem in the doctrine of pre-
emption analysis. In Riegel, Justice Scalia noted that "Congress is enti-
tled to know what meaning this Court will assign to terms regularly used
in its enactments."1 85 But lawyers and litigants are entitled to know what
approach the Court will take in reviewing ambiguity and preemption
provisions, because their claims depend on it. Nonetheless, ambiguity is
a fluid concept that has not been fully defined by the Court. 86
In a case decided shortly after Riegel, the Court stated that "[w]hen
the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible
reading, courts ordinarily 'accept the reading that disfavors pre-emp-
tion.' "187 The existence of more than one plausible reading also gives
rise to an inference of statutory ambiguity,1 88 which suggests that the
Court should consult legislative history or other interpretive tools.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the text of the MDA's preemption
provision,1 89 the Riegel Court apparently rejected these principles of
statutory construction and preemption analysis. Its textual statutory con-
struction is also at odds with the Supreme Court's command-a pre-
179. Id. at 548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
180. Sharkey, supra note 14, at 415.
181. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008) (rejecting any notion that the
Court should rely on congressional intent or the FDA's interpretation of the MDA's meaning
because the statute was clear on its face).
182. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485-86.
183. Id. at 495 ("The FDA regulations interpreting the scope of § 360k's pre-emptive effect...
substantially informed [this opinion].").
184. Id. at 484-85 (citation omitted).
185. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
186. MAMMEN, supra note 176, at 33.
187. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (quoting Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)).
188. See MAMMEN, supra note 176, at 32 (defining ambiguity as a situation where "the
statutory text could plausibly be interpreted in two or more ways").
189. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495 ("[T]he language of ... section [360k] is not entirely clear.").
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sumption against preemption. Further, the Court should have relied on
Congress's intent, as has traditionally been the case in preemption juris-
prudence. 190 Riegel's departure from these principles injects uncertainty
into preemption analysis.
2. A FOUNDATION OF LOHR: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Although ordinary rules of statutory interpretation typically require
courts to find textual ambiguity before exploring legislative history, this
rule appears to yield in the preemption context.1 91 The Court frequently
relies on congressional intent in preemption cases because it is the core
of every preemption analysis. 192 However the Riegel Court rejected the
use of congressional intent, with Justice Scalia boldly stating, "It is not
our job to speculate upon congressional motives."' 93 In contrast, Lohr-
a case upon which Riegel heavily relied-noted that preemption must be
"the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." '194 By finding that state
law was not preempted, the Lohr Court implicitly determined that Con-
gress's purpose was neither clear nor manifest as it related to preemption
and substantially equivalent devices. If that proposition is true, then the
question becomes whether Congress's purpose regarding preemption
and PMA-approved devices was "clear and manifest."
The evidence suggests that Congress's purpose was no clearer
regarding PMA devices than it was for substantially equivalent devices.
In fact, the preemption provision articulated by Congress reflects no dif-
ference between the categories of devices.195 Rather, § 360k refers gen-
erally to "any requirement applicable under this chapter."' 19 6 It does not
evince any effort to distinguish between devices approved under the
PMA process or the § 510(k) process.
The legislative history of the MDA gives no indication that pre-
emption should turn on the depth of the FDA's analysis or the length of
time spent reviewing the device. "[A]ny understanding of the scope of a
pre-emption statute must rest primarily on 'a fair understanding of con-
190. See id. at 485 (noting that Congress's intent is the cornerstone of preemption analysis).
191. See MAMMEN, supra note 176, at 40 (noting that "the presumption of controlling text is
weakened" in preemption cases). The debate remains whether courts' consideration of
congressional intent should be limited to implied preemption analysis rather than express
preemption analysis.
192. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (noting that "'[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone'
in every preemption case" (emphasis added) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96,
103 (1963))).
193. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008).
194. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
195. 21 U.S.C. §360k (2006).
196. Id.
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gressional purpose.' "197 Congress's stated purpose in passing the MDA
was to encourage medical-device research and development, while also
balancing the device's medical benefits against potential risks. 198 Argua-
bly, the first objective may be achieved by preempting torts suits
because manufacturers may be inclined to invest more money in
research and development due to the decreased risk of postmarket litiga-
tion costs. 199 But it does not logically follow that subjecting a limited
subset of Class III devices to preemption will further this objective.
3. A FOUNDATION OF LOHR: THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
The "Riegel distinction" also does not square with the consistent
staple200 of preemption jurisprudence-the presumption against preemp-
tion. Indeed, the Court likely could not reach its conclusion in Riegel
without rejecting the presumption against preemption. Recently, the
Court has moved away from the presumption by construing express pre-
emption statements broadly.20 ' But in Lohr, the Court proclaimed that
"we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt
state-law causes of action. 20 2 This principle is grounded in the Court's
"respect for the States as 'independent sovereigns.' "203 Yet the Riegel
majority never mentioned this long-held presumption against
preemption.20 4
The absence of the presumption against preemption in Riegel can-
not be explained by Riegel's purported grounding in express preemp-
tion.2 5 The Lohr Court, which interpreted the same express preemption
provision, mandated that its interpretation be "informed" by the pre-
197. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485-86 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530
(1992)).
198. S. RaP. No. 94-33, at 2 (1975).
199. Cf FOoTE, supra note 107, at 20 (characterizing FDA regulation and products liability as
inhibiting discovery). But cf Lohr, 518 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion) (noting that the MDA lacks
any indication that Congress feared that tort suits would hinder the development of medical
devices).
200. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (citing cases as early as 1947 that proclaim the presumption
against preemption).
201. See Sharkey, supra note 14, at 416 (noting that the presumption "has receded of late in the
imagination of the Supreme Court Justices").
202. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.
203. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009).
204. Sharkey, supra note 14, at 416-17.
205. Id. at 417 n. 11 ("[T]he Court has-paradoxically-applied the presumption in the express
preemption products liability cases, but not in the implied ones." (citing Catherine M. Sharkey,
Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 458
(2008))). Less than one year after Professor Sharkey's observation, the Court applied the
presumption against preemption in Wyeth v. Levine, a case involving implied preemption and
pharmaceuticals. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95.
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sumption. 2 1 Cipollone-another express preemption case upon which
Lohr and Riegel relied-also gave credence to the presumption,20 7
despite finding that some state-law claims were preempted.
Now the question arises: is the presumption against preemption
dead in the express preemption context? Justice Scalia's comments in
his Cipollone concurrence provide some inkling as to why the presump-
tion may have died in the twelve years between Lohr and Riegel. He
stated, "[I]t seems to me that assumption [against preemption] dissolves
once there is conclusive evidence of intent to pre-empt in the express
words of the statute itself. '208 These comments indicate that Justice
Scalia disfavors any presumption against preemption in the express pre-
emption context.
Apparently, Justice Scalia is not alone in his effort to erode the
presumption.20 9 Judicial sentiment has shifted from the "Consumer Dec-
ade" 210 of the 1960s and 70s, which gave rise to consumer-protection
laws such as the MDA, to a probusiness stance that favors commerce at
the expense of state autonomy. 21 This sentiment has seeped into current
Supreme Court jurisprudence with the addition of Chief Justice John
Roberts, who is "strongly pro-business. '"212 Commentators have also
noted Justice Alito's affinity for businesses.2t 3 The change in the
Supreme Court's composition post-Lohr allowed the Riegel Court to
hold that state common law constitutes a "requirement" that may be pre-
206. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.
207. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("Consideration of issues
arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States [are] not to be superseded by . . .Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."' (alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947))).
208. Id. at 545 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
209. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's Cipollone dissent, which rejected the presumption
against preemption in the express preemption context. Id. Justice Alito has discouraged the use of
the presumption in implied preemption cases. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1228-29 (Alito, J.,
dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J. and Scalia, J.).
210. Adler & Mann, supra note 38, at 895 n. I (noting that more than half of the consumer
protection laws enacted by the federal government between 1891 and 1972 were enacted in the
"Consumer Decade" between 1966 and 1972 (citing Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product
Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 32, 34
n.2 (1982))); see also FoOTE, supra note 107, at 114 ("The late 1960s and the 1970s were a time
of growing consumer activism and power.").
211. Adler & Mann, supra note 38, at 895-96; see Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Trend in
Preemption Rulings, TmiAL, May 2008, at 62, 62 ("A tendency to find in favor of businesses
pushing the preemption argument began with the Rehnquist Court.").
212. Chemerinsky, supra note 211, at 64.
213. See, e.g., Greg Stohr, Alito Champions Business Causes in First Full High-Court Term,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 26, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=A8
MaWOPF9zK4&refer=-US.
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empted by federal requirements.214
Political influences have also played a role in the judicial shift from
consumerism to probusiness. The "preemption push" exploded in 2000
when then-presidential candidate, George W. Bush, ran on a platform
that emphasized tort reform. 215  After his election, President Bush
appointed legal counsels to key agencies, including the FDA, who
shared his views on tort reform.2 16 In 2002, the FDA began to insert
itself into drug and medical device preemption cases by filing amicus
briefs in support of the manufacturers. 1 7 Justice Breyer's inclination for
strong deference to agencies 218 combined with the probusiness stance of
the Roberts Court219 set the stage for the Court to preempt state tort suits
in Riegel.
But is the erosion of the presumption against preemption a good
thing? Preemption provisions are rarely clear-cut. 22 0 Thus, courts need
an anchor in which to begin their preemption analysis. The presumption
has provided that anchor for over sixty years. 22 ' The principle is so
embedded in the Court's jurisprudence that the Court recognized the rule
even after its decision in Riegel largely ignored it.2 22 But precedent is
not the only reason favoring the presumption. More importantly, the
principle is constitutionally grounded in state sovereignty.223 The pre-
sumption also provides an additional layer of protection for those areas
214. In Lohr, five Justices agreed with the proposition regarding common law as "state
requirements": Justices Breyer, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. When Riegel reached
the Supreme Court, Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist were no longer part of the Court, but Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito filled the void by voting for the proposition.
215. Thomas 0. McGarity, Curbing the Abuse of Corporate Power: The Perils of Preemption,
TRIAL, Sept. 2008, at 20, 21 (noting that as a presidential candidate, George W. Bush vowed to
make tort reform a high priority to combat "vexatious litigation").
216. Id. at 21. Bush-appointee Daniel Troy served as Chief Counsel to the FDA from August
2001 to November 2004 and was instrumental in promulgating the agency's push for preemption.
Carter, supra note 106, at 44.
217. Carter, supra note 106, at 43.
218. See Sharkey, supra note 14, at 421 ("Justice Breyer's strong-form deference to agencies is
guided by his conviction that agencies have a 'special understanding of the likely impact of both
state and federal requirements."' (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996)
(Breyer, J., concurring))).
219. See Chemerinsky, supra note 211, at 64 n.22 (characterizing the Roberts Court as
potentially "the most probusiness Court since the mid-1930s" (citing Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme
Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38, 40)).
220. Sharkey, supra note 14, at 415; Epstein, supra note 150, at 55.
221. See supra note 200 (noting that the presumption has been recognized since at least 1947).
222. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009) (characterizing the presumption as
a cornerstone of preemption jurisprudence); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543
(2008) (noting the applicability of the presumption in express and implied preemption cases).
223. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("[B]ecause the States are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed [against preemption]."
(emphasis added)).
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left untouched by the preemption provision, by acting as a check on
unwarranted judicial intrusion to ensure that courts do not exceed the
bounds prescribed by Congress.224
4. A FOUNDATION OF LOHR: DEFERENCE TO THE FDA
Agency interpretations are another interpretive tool used by the
Court to construe ambiguous statutes.225 Agencies interpret statutes in
many different media including, but not limited to, duly promulgated
regulations and amici briefs.226 The level of deference that should be
afforded to each is unclear, 227 and Riegel did nothing to clarify the issue.
This section will briefly address deference to agency regulations, fol-
lowed by agency positions in amici briefs.
The Lohr opinion was "substantially informed" by FDA regulations
interpreting the scope of the MDA's preemption provision.228 Specifi-
cally, Lohr interpreted the MDA in light of 21 C.F.R. § 808. 1(d), which
provides: "State or local requirements are preempted only when the
[FDA] has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other
specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the
[MDA]." Lohr has been described as one of the "peaks of modem judi-
cial deference to the FDA. 2 2 9
Riegel acknowledged Lohr's reliance on the FDA's regulation and
used Lohr's regulation-based framework to determine that the PMA pro-
cess is device specific and therefore a federal requirement.23° Indeed, the
Riegel Court could not rely on Lohr without accepting (to a certain
degree) the FDA's interpretation of the statute, because Lohr's "device-
specific" analysis was predicated on the FDA's interpretation of the
224. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (noting that when
Congress expressly defines the bounds of preemption, it is implied that matters beyond those
bounds are not preempted).
225. MAMMEN, supra note 176, at 18.
226. Richard C. Ausness, "After You, My Dear Alphonse!": Should the Courts Defer to the
FDA's New Interpretation of § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80 TUL. L. REV.
727, 772 (2006). Many scholars and judges have debated the amount of deference that courts
should generally give the FDA, and no clear answer has emerged. Compare Sharkey, supra note
14, at 418 (proposing a model that "facilitate[s] input from federal agencies"), and Lohr, 518 U.S.
at 496 (noting that the FDA is "uniquely qualified" to determine the preemptive effect on state
law), with Epstein, supra note 150, at 62-63 (criticizing agency deference in favor of field
preemption), and Lohr, 518 U.S. at 512 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(questioning the majority's deference to the agency's interpretation where a "clear statute [is] at
issue").
227. Ausness, supra note 226, at 772.
228. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.
229. James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA's Second Century: Judicial Review,
Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 939, 943 (2008).
230. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1006-07 (2008).
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MDA's preemption provision.23'
But in another part of its analysis, Riegel adopted a neutral stance
on deference to regulations, "[n]either accepting nor rejecting the pro-
position that [§ 808.1(d)(1)] can properly be consulted to determine the
statute's meaning. ' '232 The Court's reluctance to defer to FDA regula-
tions is puzzling in light of its heavy reliance on § 808.1(d) in determin-
ing that the PMA process was device specific. Thus the level of
deference that the Court will give to FDA regulations remains unclear
after Riegel.
FDA interpretations expressed in amici briefs may be entitled to
even less deference than agency regulations, 233 because the former are
not subject to formal adjudication procedures such as notice and com-
ment periods.234 Further, Professor Richard A. Epstein points out "the
dangers of agency flip-flop" that generally accompany agency defer-
ence. 235 A forerunner to Riegel is illustrative of this danger. In Smith
Industries Medical Systems, Inc. v. Kernats,23 6 the government submit-
ted an amicus brief, expressing its view that the PMA process did not
preempt state tort law claims.23 7 This position was, of course, in direct
opposition to the government's stance in Riegel, where it deemed the
PMA process a federal requirement that should preempt state law.2 38
The Riegel majority noted this "flip-flop" and hypothesized that the
level of deference to the FDA's new position "might be reduced by the
fact that the agency's earlier position was different. 2 39
Presidents have differing philosophies regarding preemption, tort
reform, and federalism that leave agencies' positions on these matters
231. Lohr acknowledged "the critical importance of device specificity in our (and the FDA's)
construction of § 360k." Lohr, 518 U.S. at 502 (plurality opinion).
232. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011. The Court's ambivalence regarding agency deference signals a
larger divide among the Court than the 8-1 Riegel majority would suggest. See Sharkey, supra
note 14, at 421 (noting that "equivocation was [likely] necessary to carry an eight-Justice
majority").
233. See generally Ausness, supra note 226 (discussing the reasons why the FDA's new
position on preemption, articulated in multiple amici curiae briefs, is not entitled to deference).
234. Id. at 773.
235. Epstein, supra note 150, at 63 (citing Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt
Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagarenda, 1 J.
TORT L. art.5, at 15 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.comjtl/voll/issl/art5/).
236. 669 N.E. 2d 1300 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
237. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Smith Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v.
Kernats, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998) (No. 96-1405), 1997 WL 33561767 ("[T]he FDA's grant of... a
PMA does not, by itself, have preemptive effect.").
238. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179), 2007 WL 3231418.
239. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009 (emphasis added). The Court noted that deference was not
warranted in this case because the text of the statute was clear. Id.
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open to modifications. 240 "A change in presidential administrations
could bring a change in philosophy, yet again." '241 Thus, Riegel's possi-
ble shift away from deference to agency amici briefs may help to bring
more consistency to the Court's MDA preemption jurisprudence.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. Litigants in Search of a Framework
Ultimately, Riegel prevents injured consumers from bringing some
common-law tort suits against manufacturers of PMA-approved
devices.242 Given that Lohr is left undisturbed,243 injured consumers still
have a defective-design cause of action against manufacturers of sub-
stantially equivalent devices.24' Although it seems fundamentally unfair
that consumers' ability to recover for their injuries is bifurcated depend-
ing on how the device came to market,245 Riegel does not preclude all
claims against manufacturers of PMA-approved devices. State-law
claims alleging that a manufacturer has acted in violation of FDA regu-
lations are not preempted.246 For example, negligent manufacturing
claims still survive because they rest upon a showing that the manufac-
turer did not follow FDA requirements; therefore, there is no conflict
between state and federal requirements. 247 A claim may also exist for
"situations where new product risks come to light after the FDA's initial
approval. 248
Though Riegel's holding is somewhat narrow in the medical-device
context, it has the potential to reach beyond the device industry. The
central issue is the uncertainty that Riegel has injected into the express
preemption debate. After Riegel, it is unclear whether the presumption
against preemption will resurface.249 Some of the Justices, particularly
240. See discussion supra Part IlI.B.3 (discussing President Bush's sweeping change in the
FDA's approach to preemption and tort reform).
241. Carter, supra note 106, at 47.
242. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009.
243. By relying heavily on Lohr, the Riegel Court implicitly found that Lohr's holding is still
good law. See id. at 1006.
244. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 492 (1996).
245. This fundamental unfairness is magnified by the fact that the legislative history does not
appear to indicate any intent to create such a barrier. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
246. See Greenhouse, supra note 105 ("The [Riegel] decision ... does not foreclose lawsuits
claiming that a device was made improperly, in violation of FDA specifications.").
247. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011 (noting that state tort laws that "'parallel,' rather than add
to, federal requirements" are not preempted).
248. Sharkey, supra note 14, at 428 (emphasis added) (citing Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013 n.1
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
249. See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the notable absence of the presumption
against preemption in Riegel). But see Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008)
(indicating that the presumption is still alive in the cigarette labeling context).
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Justices Scalia and Thomas, seem unwilling to recognize the presump-
tion against preemption when the statute contains an express preemption
provision.25 Although the majority of the Supreme Court has yet to
accept this position,25 the judicial shift in this direction is instructive for
express preemption analysis. The level of deference that the Court will
give to congressional intent and agency interpretations is also
unpredictable."'
In Wyeth v. Levine,253 the Supreme Court provided some answers
regarding Riegel's implications for implied preemption cases. In the
implied preemption realm, the Court has yet to reject or ignore congres-
sional intent, as it did in Riegel. The Court's treatment of congressional
intent in Levine sheds light on this issue. Before determining that the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) did not impliedly preempt state
tort-law claims,2 4 the Levine Court noted the importance of congres-
sional purpose as one of the "cornerstones of ... pre-emption jurispru-
dence" '255 and analyzed the Act's history to determine congressional
purpose.2 56 The presumption against preemption also resurfaced, and the
Court explicitly rejected the notion that the presumption should not be
applied in implied preemption cases.2 57 Although Levine seems to have
provided some clarity for implied preemption analysis, the future of
express preemption analysis is more unsettled.
B. Device Manufacturers: A Spark for Innovation?
The result in Riegel was the best that device manufacturers could
have hoped for, 58 short of overturning Lohr. Riegel may not have wide-
sweeping effect because fewer devices undergo the premarket approval
process as compared to the number of devices subject to substantial
250. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Thomas, J.) (noting that the presumption
against preemption disappears when Congress expresses its intent to preempt in the statute).
251. Justice Thomas recently noted, "Since Cipollone, the Court's reliance on the presumption
against pre-emption has waned in the express pre-emption context." Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at
556 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). However, he never states that the presumption has
been explicitly rejected. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court has in fact relied on the
presumption in express preemption cases since Cipollone).
252. See discussion supra Parts l1I.B.2, III.B.4 (discussing the Riegel majority's rejection of
the need to rely on congressional intent and its middle-of-the-road approach to agency deference).
253. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
254. See id. at 1204.
255. Id. at 1194.
256. Id. at 1195-96.
257. Id. at 1195 n.3.
258. See Brief for the Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed), et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179),
2007 WL 3095371 (advocating preemption of state tort law on behalf of various medical device
organizations).
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equivalence review. 259 Riegel will also cause some manufacturers to be
subject to inconsistent standards for their devices,2 60 but most manufac-
turers will likely believe that some preemption is better than none at all.
Manufacturers were looking for relief because they had become increas-
ingly subject to liability suits.2 61 Now that Riegel has held that manufac-
turers of some devices are exempt from defective design liability, this
trend toward increased liability suits may change.
The legal protection that Riegel afforded to PMA-approved devices
may be tempting for some manufacturers, but whether it will cause more
manufacturers to pursue PMA review remains to be seen. The PMA pro-
cess is "a much more significant financial barrier to the market" (with
costs ranging from $111,000 to $828,000 per device) than the § 510(k)
process (which typically costs less than $2,000 per device). 262 Smaller
medical-device companies are far more burdened by these regulatory
costs than large companies like Medtronic. 263 Product-liability risks
remain a significant challenge for "emerging companies," which often
have limited resources, limited liability expertise, and limited ability to
properly estimate the risks. 2"
Although larger companies are better able to absorb the financial
risks associated with the PMA process, protection from products liabil-
ity-which manufacturers characterize as an inhibitor of innova-
tion26 5 -is unlikely to impact a manufacturer's business decision to
pursue new, cutting-edge technology that would be subject to PMA
review.2 66 Substantial equivalence review remains the most attractive,
short-term option for manufacturers because it is less expensive and less
time consuming, allowing manufacturers to enter the market more
259. See Sharkey, supra note 14, at 428 (noting that only about 10% of devices undergo PMA
review).
260. Only manufacturers that market PMA-approved devices and substantially equivalent
devices will be subject to dilferent liability standards after the outcome in Riegel.
261. See FooTE, supra note 107, at 147 (noting that device manufacturers has become
frequently named defendants in device liability litigation).
262. Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1369 n.l (11th Cir. 1999).
263. See FOOTE, supra note 107, at 136.
264. Product Liability Risks for Emerging Life Sciences Technology Companies, Rx FOR RIsK
(Medmarc Ins. Group, Chantilly, Va.), Mar. 2007, at 1, 1, available at http://www.medmarc.coml
Resources/Newsletters/Rx%20for%2ORisk%20-%20Issue%2007.pdf.
265. See McGARrry, supra, note 52, at 222 (noting a Medtronic representative's statement that
"[e]very dollar that we need to divert to pay for lawsuits takes money away from research and
development" (quoting Joan Biskupic, Manufacturer Liability Is at Heart of Pacemaker Case,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 1996, at A4)).
266. MX Business Strategies for Medical Technology Executives, http://www.devicelink.coml
mx/issuesupdate/08/02/Riegel.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009) ("[T]he business imperative of
getting to market faster via 510(k) clearance is likely to override the enhanced legal protection
afforded to PMA devices.").
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quickly.2 67 The number of FDA approvals illustrates this concept. In
2005, the FDA granted over 3,000 § 510(k) submissions compared to
only thirty-two PMAs. 268 These numbers are unlikely to change over-
night. Nonetheless, the long-term savings on litigation costs and liability
insurance 269 that may result from Riegel are undeniable. The unan-
swered question is where will manufacturers choose to spend this
money.
C. Physicians: Caught in the Crosshairs
"Device manufacturers [had] replaced physicians as the most fre-
quently named defendants in cases involving medical device use,"'270
largely because of caps on medical malpractice liability in various
states. 271 Riegel provides an illustrative example of a patient choosing to
sue the manufacturer, rather than the doctor, when something goes
wrong with a medical device. The evidence suggests that Mr. Riegel's
physician did not use the device in accordance with the labeling.272 But
it appears that the Riegels did not attempt to sue the doctor.273
Doctors are obviously concerned that the tide may change post-
Riegel, now that some patients may be left without a claim against the
manufacturer. Several editors of the New England Journal of Medicine
implied that Riegel could signal bad news for doctors: "If injured
patients are unable to seek legal redress from manufacturers of defective
products, they may instead turn elsewhere. ' 274 This may be especially
true when doctors use the device for an "off-label" use that has not been
specifically approved by the FDA.275
But doctors are unlikely to take a passive approach to the potential
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Cf Sara Dyson, Protecting PMA Devices and Their Makers, MED. DEVICE & DIACNOSTIC
INDUSTRY MAG., Feb. 2009, available at http:l/www.devicelink.com/mddilarchivelO9/02/007.html
(noting that the cost of defending a products liability suit caused a pharmaceutical manufacturer's
insurance premiums to increase to an estimated ten million dollars).
270. FooTE, supra note 107, at 147.
271. Id. at 148.
272. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005 (2008) (noting that the doctor inserted
the balloon catheter into a patient with "diffusely diseased and heavily calcified" arteries even
though the device was contraindicated for such patients). The doctor also inflated the balloon
beyond the recommended pressure. Id.
273. Dr. Eric Roccario, the physician who treated Mr. Riegel, served as an expert in the
Plaintiff's case. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 99-CV-0649, 2003 WL 25556778, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003) (noting that Mr. Riegel's treating physician was Dr. Eric S. Roccario);
Affidavit of Eric Roccario, M.D., Riegel, 2003 WL 25556778 (No. 99-CV-0649), 1996 WL
34432790.
274. Dr. Gregory Curfman et al., Why Doctors Should Worry About Preemption, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1, 3 (2008).
275. See James B. Riley, Jr. & P. Aaron Basillus, Physicians' Liability for Off-Label
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change in the liability landscape. Doctors have already testified before
Congress in support of reversing Riege1276 and written strong rebukes of
Riegel in leading medical journals. 277 Although doctors have tradition-
ally enjoyed good relationships with medical-device manufacturers, this
tradition may change if manufacturers enjoy reduced liability exposure
at doctors' expense.278 "[Pihysicians are becoming more willing to
blame drug and device manufacturers for perceived problems with...
allegedly defective drug[s] or device[s]. '' 279 Thus the future of doctor-
manufacturer relationships bears watching.
D. Legislative Response
Some Congressmen have reacted strongly to the Riegel ruling. Sen-
ator Edward Kennedy, who filed an amicus brief in support of the
Riegels,280 commented: "Congress never intended that FDA approval
would give blanket immunity to manufacturers from liability for injuries
caused by faulty devices .... Congress obviously needs to correct the
court's decision."28' U.S. Representative Henry Waxman, who joined
Senator Kennedy's amicus brief28 2 and sat on the House Committee that
approved the MDA in 1976, reportedly characterized Riegel's effect as
"nonsensical. 283
Congress has proposed legislation to counter Riegel's effect. The
Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, introduced by Senator Kennedy and
United States Representative Frank Pallone, Jr. would effectively over-
turn Riegel by exempting state tort-law claims from preemption under
the MDA. 284 Specifically, the Act would amend the preemption provi-
Prescriptions, HEMATOLOGY & ONCOLOGY NEWS & ISSUES, May-June 2007, at 24, 37 (noting
that off-label use of medical devices may increase physicians' exposure to liability).
276. Should FDA Drug and Medical Device Regulation Bar State Liability Claims? Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, l10th Cong. 106-09 (2008)
(statement of Dr. Gregory Curfman, Executive Editor of the New England Journal of Medicine).
277. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of Preempting Tort Litigation:
FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 299 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2313 (2008) (criticizing the effects
of the Riegel decision).
278. See Edward J. Sebold & John Q. Lewis, Physician Suits Against Pharmaceutical and
Medical Device Manufacturers: Friend Turned Foe?, MEALEY'S LIG. REP.: DIABETES DRUGS,
July 2002, available in LEXIS Mealey's Publication File ("[I]ncreased exposure associated with
... physician [malpractice] lawsuits may affect the way business is done between drug and device
manufacturers and the physicians who purchase or use their products.").
279. Id.
280. Brief of Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representative Henry A. Waxman, as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179),
2007 WL 2456945.
281. Greenhouse, supra note 105.
282. See supra note 280.
283. Greenhouse, supra note 105.
284. S. 540, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009).
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sion to state, "Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or
otherwise affect any action for damages or the liability of any person
under the law of any State." '285 Dr. Gregory Curfman, executive editor of
the New England Journal of Medicine, testified in support of this legis-
lation before a House of Representatives Committee, noting that pre-
emption "is ill advised and will result in less safe medical products for
the American people." '286
V. CONCLUSION
What a difference twelve years can make. Had the Court decided
Riegel twelve years ago, the outcome might have been drastically differ-
ent. But with new Justices and new philosophies, the Supreme Court
went out of its way to reject any deference to the FDA, congressional
intent, or the deeply rooted presumption against preemption. With its
new brand of express preemption analysis, the Supreme Court pushed
aside nearly sixty years of preemption jurisprudence.
Though Riegel might provide an interesting lesson in judicial phi-
losophy, it stands alone in a long line of preemption jurisprudence,
largely because it cannot be reconciled with its predecessor, Lohr. Lohr
likely reached the right outcome (denying preemption), but its underly-
ing basis was shaky due to the Court's inability to settle the Cipollone
proposition. This series of missteps by the Court-first in Cipollone,
then in Lohr-culminated in the "Riegel distinction." This bright-line
rule does not achieve Congress's desire to establish a uniform standard
because it subjects device manufacturers to different levels of liability
based on the nature of the FDA approval process. The PMA and
§ 510(k) processes may differ substantially in the amount of resources
that the FDA expends in reviewing each application, but the conclusion
that they differ substantially in their specificity to the device does not
follow.
Certainly, the MDA's preemption provision must displace some
state law, or it would be deprived of all meaning. But the indicators
suggest that Congress did not intend to displace state common law. Con-
gress is, and should remain, the ultimate voice in the preemption debate.
Legislators seem poised to the take back their role as that ultimate voice
by passing legislation that would abrogate Riegel. In the end, Justice
Scalia might argue that this is the proper result because of his resistance
to "legislating from the bench." But it will be too late for the Riegels.
285. S. 540 § 2(a).
286. Should FDA Drug and Medical Device Regulation Bar State Liability Claims? Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, I10th Cong. 106-09 (2008)
(statement of Dr. Gregory Curfman, Executive Editor of the New England Journal of Medicine).
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